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This article explores the dynamics of the law in action beyond the binary formal/informal, using 
Tunisian jurisprudence in the field of prostitution as a case study. It examines what the for-
mal/informal distinction means in an authoritarian context where formal norms contrast signifi-
cantly with informal norms: do judges apply the formal norm, or do they apply the informal one, 
and if so, how do they justify this? This article argues that judges instrumentalise a formal norm 
(i.e. the ban on prostitution) to impose an informal one (prohibiting extra-marital sex). As a re-
sult, the norm prohibiting extra-marital sex can no longer be situated in the formal/informal di-
vide: it is not informal, as judges are State officials punishing the violation of this norm; and it is 
not formal either, since the norm does not form part of legislation and Tunisian judges, exercising 
their profession in a civil law country, do not make law. 
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1. Introduction: the formal/informal divide1 
 
Whereas the study of law has predominantly been shaped by a positivist 
outlook, in that legal scholars have maintained a focus on legislation, legal academ-
ics since the start of the 20th Century have been increasingly interested in the prac-
tices of judges. This interest emerged with Scandinavian Legal Realism, a branch of 
legal philosophy that argued that in order to study the ‘law’, legal scholars should 
look at judicial practice.2 It was not until the 1970s that this interest in judicial prac-
tices took a more concrete turn. Indeed, it has evolved from a philosophical and 
theoretical discussion on ‘what law is’ to a sub-discipline of law and anthropology in 
the form of ‘legal pluralism’. Researchers in the field of legal pluralism are interested 
in how law plays out on the ground (the law in action as opposed to the law in the 
books), especially in developing countries.3 They look at mechanisms of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) and normative orders alternative to legislation, such as 
custom, religious law, social norms and international law. As such, there exist vari-
ous dichotomies which underpin studies in legal pluralism, namely the dichotomy 
between the ‘courts’ and ‘ADR’, and between formal norms/State law and informal 
norms/non-State law. Consequently, the dualist approach to law remains dominant 
in non-positivist legal studies. In reality, however, the formal/informal divide is not 
always that clear-cut, in particular when official State institutions such as the judici-
ary, apply informal norms instead of (and opposed to) State law. 
This article explores the dynamics of the law in action beyond the binary 
formal/informal, using Tunisian jurisprudence in the field of prostitution as a case 
study. It examines what the formal/informal distinction means in an authoritarian 
context where formal norms contrast significantly with informal norms. Do judges 
apply the formal norm, or do they apply the informal one, and if so, how do they 
justify this? I argue that judges instrumentalise a formal norm (i.e. the ban on prosti-
1 The author would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Gerda Henkel 
Foundation for their funding during the writing of this article. 
2  For Scandinavian Realism, see Stromholm 1994. 
3 For a clear introduction in the fields of interest of legal pluralism, see Fuller 1994. 
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tution) to impose an informal one (prohibiting extra-marital sex). This is what I call 
‘the formalisation of an informal norm’. As a result, the norm prohibiting extra-
marital sex can no longer be situated in the formal/informal divide: it is not infor-
mal, as judges are State officials punishing the violation of this norm; and it is not 
formal either, since the norm does not form part of legislation and Tunisian judges, 
exercising their profession in a civil law country, do not make law. 
By using Tunisia as a case study, I do not suggest that the formalisation of 
informal norms through judicial practice is unique to this country, or North Africa, 
or developing countries in general. In fact, when looking at the case of Tunisia, the 
phenomenon appears to be facilitated by what I call ‘authoritarian State feminism’, 
where repression allows laws and policies in the field of gender, sexuality and moral-
ity to conflict with the societal norms, and where such laws bestow wide-ranging 
discretionary powers on judges. 
 
1.1 Informal norms, formal norms and formalisation 
In the above, I have used the terms non-State law, lived law and informal 
norms interchangeably. In all cases, I refer to those norms that organise individual 
behaviour but that do not form part of legislation. In the field of social economy 
and comparative politics the term ‘informal’ is relatively recurrent. According to 
Routh, ‘informal’, as in informal employment, denotes the diverse practices and ac-
tions that are not regulated by the State (Routh 2011). In comparative politics, in-
formal institutions, including informal rules, are termed the norms that are not insti-
tutionalised but are the actual rules that are being followed (O’Donnell 1996, p. 10). 
In legal pluralism, authors have used different terms to denote informal norms, 
ranging from ‘unofficial law’,4 ‘indigenous law’ (Galanter 1981) and ‘folk law’ (Starr 
1985), to ‘cultural’ (Rosen 1989), ‘social’ (Bowen 2001) and ‘practical’ (Olivier de 
Sardan 2015) norms.5 The use of the term ‘informal’ is preferable as it ascribes per-
4 Hence the title of the journal dedicated to the subject of legal pluralism: The Journal of Legal Pluralism 
and Unofficial Law.  
5 On this debate, see Merry 1988, pp. 875-9. 
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formativity to the term ‘formalisation’, by uncovering the process of turning an in-
formal norm into a formal one. 
With ‘formalisation’ I refer to an act that takes place in judicial practice. This 
focus on practice to look at norms is inspired by Foucault’s ideas on the production 
of truth. He argued that norms do not exist, but that they are produced by, what he 
calls, powerful institutions. The production of norms is an instance of the produc-
tion of truth: if powerful institutions such as legislators, courts but also, for Fou-
cault, psychiatric hospitals, define behaviour A as ‘the norm’ and behaviour B as 
‘abnormal’, these institutions are producing what ‘normal’ behaviour is (Link and Hall 
2004). Foucault calls this act ‘normalisation’: the act of making the norm (Foucault 
1975).6 Applied to the case of Tunisian court practice, the judges normalise certain 
behaviour, that is: through their practice, they create conceptions of normal and ab-
normal. Unlike Foucault, I prefer the term formalisation in order to highlight the rela-
tionship between the norm that judges produce and the one that society produces: 
the norm on extramarital sex does not come from these judges, it comes from the 
society of which these judges form part. Therefore, formalisation refers to the act of 
normalisation by a powerful institution (the court) of a norm that was originally in-
formal. 
 
1.2 Sources 
This study is based on 31 prostitution cases trialled by the Court of  
Cassation, Tunisia’s highest court.7 I focus on the highest Court for three reasons: 
(1) its rulings contain information about three levels of  adjudication (Court of  First 
Instance, Court of  Appeal and the Court of  Cassation), and about the practices of  
police and the Public Prosecutor’s office; (2) despite Tunisia being a civil law 
6 “La pénalité perpétuelle qui traverse tous les points, et contrôle tous les instants des institutions 
disciplinaires, compare, différencie, hiérarchise, homogénéise, exclut. En un mot: elle normalise.” 
(Foucault 1975, p. 185). 
7 I want to thank Sadri Saied and Karim el Chazli from the Institut Suisse de Droit Comparé in Lau-
sanne and Mohamed Ali Ettoughourti, lawyer at the Tunisian Court of Cassation, for their help in 
retrieving these decisions, and Mohammed Habibullah Scheikani for his assistance in translating 
them. 
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country, the highest court does have some influence on lower court’s practice; and 
(3) it is the only court whose rulings are public.  
The high court rulings are published in an annual bulletin, the Nashriyat al-
mahkama al-ta‘qibiyya, and online on the website of  the Ministry of  justice.8 The 
collection reflects the practices during the rule of  Bourguiba (1956-1989) and Ben 
Ali (1987-2011): I obtained nineteen rulings from the time period 1970-1987 and 
twelve from the time period 1987-2011. They thus give information about court 
practice as it existed between the first decade of  independence (court practice of  
the late 1960s is reflected in the earliest rulings’ summaries of  lower court rulings in 
the same case) and the end of  Ben Ali’s rule. The data collection contains all 
published rulings from the highest court that I found with the search terms 231 (the 
article number), bigha’ and khina’ (the relevant legal terms of  prostitution). The 
Court stopped publishing its rulings on paper in 2009, when online publications 
continued sporadically until 2013. However, no rulings on prostitution were 
published in the period post-Ben Ali. 
This article proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the background of  the 
article on prostitution, revealing the divergence between the formal and the 
informal norm. Section 3 examines its application by judges, showing that judges 
instrumentalise the article on prostitution to prohibit all kinds of  extra-marital sex. 
Section 4 situates this formalisation of  the informal norm through judicial practice 
in the authoritarian context. 
2. Tunisia and sex crimes 
After three centuries of  relative independence under official Ottoman rule, 
Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881. Under French domination, the first 
codifications were issued to replace classical Islamic law and various decrees from 
the ruler. Around the turn of  the century, Tunisia adopted a Civil Code, a Criminal 
Code and Codes of  Civil and Criminal Procedure, inspired on French law and 
8 http://jurisprudence.e-justice.tn/wwwisis/juris.10/form.htm, 1956-2013. 
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applied by national courts as opposed to the religious court system. As was 
common in colonies, the French powers left personal status law (laws pertaining to 
marriage, divorce, inheritance etc.) untouched, meaning that religious sheikhs 
continued to apply classical norms in religious courts.  
Upon independence in 1956, the nationalist leader Habib Bourguiba, a 
lawyer trained in France, became president of  the Tunisian Republic. One of  his 
first legislative acts was the codification of  personal status law, to be applied by 
national courts. Tunisia owes its reputation of  being a ‘modernist’ and ‘secularist’ 
‘exception’ primarily to this Personal Status Code (PSC), which grants equal divorce 
rights to men and women, abolishes repudiation and punishes polygamy. Later 
reforms further completed this modernisation project, with a law punishing 
customary marriage,9 the legalisation of  abortion,10 and several reforms to the 
Criminal Code punishing sex with minor girls, raising the punishment for rape, and 
making adultery punishable for women and men.11 Ben Ali continued the 
modernisation project with a second reform to the Personal Status Code in 199312 
and the issuance of  a small series of  separate laws in the field of  gender, including a 
law granting rights to children born out of  wedlock,13 and the criminalisation of  
sexual harassment.14 It is no exaggeration to state that this legislative ensemble forms 
an example for women’s rights activists throughout the region.15  
The laws in the field of  gender and sexuality thus generally fit Tunisia’s 
modernist and secularist reputation. This is not only true for the laws issued upon 
independence, such as the Personal Status Code and its reforms, but also for the 
Criminal Code. Issued in 1913 and preserved after independence, this law upholds a 
9 Article 36 of the Code of Civil Status of 1957. 
10 Article 214 Penal Code as modified by law 65-24 of 1 July 1965 and Decree-law 73-2 of 26 Sep-
tember 1973 ratified by law 73-57 of 19 November 1973. 
11 Law 68-1 of 8 March 1968. 
12 Law 93-74 of 12 July 1993. 
13 Law 98-75 of 28 October 1998. 
14 Law 2004-73 of 2 August 2004. 
15 This is particularly true for its abolition of polygamy, see Welchman 2007, p. 78. 
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relatively liberal attitude towards sexuality:16 the Tunisian law is silent on extra-
marital sexual relations except in specific circumstances, namely sexual intercourse 
with a minor, rape, adultery, homosexual relations and prostitution.17 This approach 
towards sexual relations is relatively unique in the region, as in most Muslim-
majority countries, laws pertaining to gender and morality are inspired by classical 
Islamic precepts, prohibiting all extra-marital sex under the prohibition of  zina.18 
For instance, in Morocco, both parties engaged in extra-marital sex are punished 
with between one month and one year in prison.19  
Despite the legalisation of  extra-marital sexual relations by the 1913 law, 
these have remained socially taboo. A survey conducted in 2014 shows that for 90 
% of  the Tunisian population, extra-marital sex is unacceptable, and for 89 %, pre-
marital sexual relations are too.20 These percentages are similar to the countries in 
the region where the law is much less liberal. In Egypt, for instance, the percentages 
are 90 and 91 % respectively, and in Jordan 93 and 95 %.21 This survey thus reveals 
a strong informal norm according to which sex before or outside marriage is 
forbidden. My own observations during my fieldwork in 2008-2009 and 2011-2012 
confirmed the existence of  this informal norm: I noticed for instance that lay 
people are convinced that extra-marital sex is forbidden by law, having also learned 
this in school. 
The relationship between the formal and the informal norm is thus one of  
conflict: the informal norm was not codified, as the legislator introduced a formal 
16 Note that the Tunisian Code punishes homosexuality and lesbianism with three years in prison 
(Article 230) and adultery with five (Article 236), and that it forbids to serve alcohol to Muslims (Ar-
ticle 317). 
17 Articles 230, 236, 227, 230 and 227 bis. 
18 One of the crimes mentioned in the Qur’an that face corporal punishment. Zina is every sexual 
relation (with penetration) out of wedlock. In classical Islam, men could equally have legal sexual re-
lations with their own female slave. See Peters 2005. 
19 Article 490 of the Moroccan Penal Code. 
20 Pew morality index 2014, viewed on 27 November 2018, 
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/15/global-morality/country/tunisia/. 
21 Pew morality index 2014, viewed on 27 November 2018,  
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/15/global-morality/country/egypt/>, 
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/15/global-morality/country/jordan/>. 
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norm that is opposite to the informal one.22 This conflict can be attributed to the 
fact that it was not a Tunisian legislator, but the French coloniser who introduced 
this law. Even if  the latter refrained from simply transplanting the French Code 
Napoléon onto the Tunisian context, as was done in neighbouring Algeria, the 
French dominated the Tunisian codification process in the field of  civil and penal 
law. When Tunisia became independent in 1956, however, the new Tunisian 
President did not change the legislation to bring it closer to Tunisian informal 
norms. On the contrary, Bourguiba introduced more laws and policies that, 
according to political scientist François Burgat, “went counter to the cultural 
representations that were dominant among a large majority of  the population” 
(Burgat 1992). As such, the production of  law was fully inscribed in the 
authoritarian context as described by Tunisia specialists Camau23 and Hibou24: 
formal laws were imposed on society without taking note of  the demands of  the 
people.25 Such neglect of  demands from society, as expressed by religious groups, 
but also by human rights organisations and women’s rights organisations, was 
facilitated by the security State apparatus that was responsible for the repression of  
the Tunisian people until 2011. 
 
2.1 Prostitution 
22 On the different relationships between formal and informal norms, see for instance Lauth, 2000, 
p. 25. 
23 For Bourguiba’s era (1956-1987), Michel Camau wrote that “the Tunisian leadership has not 
stopped to combine two major characteristics: a strong degree of individualisation and an authoritar-
ian form of power.” (Camau 2004, p. 180, translation is mine). See also Meddeb 2012. Note that sev-
eral authors tried to add nuance to the label of authoritarianism for the Tunisian case, without, how-
ever, denying it (e.g. Camau 2005). 
24 With respect to the rule of Ben Ali (1987-2011), Béatrice Hibou observed that “Tunisia … is in-
contestably an authoritarian regime and a police State, where human rights violations are numerous, 
characterised by the total absence of press freedom and the freedom of association, and a political 
pluralism de façade,” Hibou 1999, p. 48 (translation is mine). See also the works of Steffen Erdle, Vin-
cent Geisser, Eric Gobe, and Larbi Chouikha. 
25 Redissi characterises pre-2011 Tunisia not as a State upholding the Rule of Law, where the State is 
submitted the the law, but as a State of power (Machtsstaat), which “reduces the law to a mere in-
strument of State activity”, Redissi 2004, p. 216 (translation is mine). Compare Rafaa Ben Achour 
1995, who stresses that this is true despite the ‘vernis démocratique’ guaranteed by the 1959 Consti-
tution. 
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Where State law deviates from the norms embedded in society, judges, 
although State officials, continued to apply the informal norm prohibiting extra-
marital sex. The vagueness of  the article on prostitution facilitated this practice 
through a wide interpretation of  ‘prostitution’, in which judges could punish all 
sorts of  extra-marital sexual relations. 
The Tunisian article on prostitution has a fascinating history. The Tunisian 
Penal Code of  1913 forbade the act of  prostitution in its Article 231, punishing 
“the person who habitually excites, favours or facilitates debauchery or corruption 
of  the youth of  either sex”. In 1942, however, the French ruler alleviated the 
interdiction: a decree of  1942 differentiates between legal and illegal prostitution, 
placing legal prostitutes under the custody of  the Ministry as State officials, 
organising them in neighbourhoods specifically designated for prostitution.26 In 
1949, the Protectorate erased Article 231 from the Penal Code altogether. As a 
result, only the pimp (sanctioned by Article 232) was punishable.27 Upon 
independence, Bourguiba reintroduced Article 231 and reformed it, punishing 
prostitutes and their clients.28 At the same time, the system of  legal prostitution was 
maintained: Article 231 refers to the decree of  1942 as an exception to the overall 
prostitution ban. The legislative situation today is that prostitution is illegal, except 
in the specific neighbourhoods assigned to legal prostitution, such as the Rue Sidi 
Abdallah Guech in the old medina of  Tunis. Prostitution in these neighbourhoods 
is carried out by a fixed number of  prostitutes who are working as State officials 
and are under close control of  the police, in accordance with the 1942 decree. 
 
2.2 What is ‘prostitution’ anyway? 
Article 231 states: “Apart from the cases covered by other regulations [i.e. 
the 1942 decree], women who, with gestures or words, offer themselves to passers-
26 Taraud argues that this organisation served to “prevent the masses of indigenous prostitutes to 
contaminate the French nation” (Taraud 2009, p. 86). On Tunisian legal prostitution and the prosti-
tution neighbourhoods in the past, see also Kerrou and M’halla 1991. 
27 Decree of 26 May 1949. See Sana Ben Achour 2016, p. 77. 
28 Laws 64-34 of 2 July 1964 and 68-1 of 8 March 1968. 
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by or engage in prostitution, even occasionally, are punished with six months to two 
years in prison and a fine of  20 to 200 Tunisian Dinars [the equivalent of  10 to 100 
euros].29 Every person who has had sexual intercourse with these women is 
considered an accomplice and punished with the same penalty.” The article thus 
punishes three acts: (1.) offering oneself  through gestures or words; (2.) 
prostitution; (3.) sexual intercourse with a woman who offers herself  or who 
prostitutes.30 
The text of  the law suggests that a woman is punished if  she engages in 
prostitution or if  she merely offers herself  for prostitution. But what is meant by 
‘prostitution’ here? The Tunisian law does not specify this term, which remains 
vague. The Arabic text employs the term khina’. This term is specific for Tunisian 
Arabic; in Modern Standard Arabic the usual term would be bagha’. It seems to be 
derived from the verb khanu, which the dictionary of  Hans Wehr defines as “To use 
obscene language, something indecent or obscene, prostitution, fornication”. In the 
French version (Tunisia publishes laws in Arabic and in French), the law employs 
the term ‘prostitution’, which according to the French dictionary Larousse means the 
“Acte par lequel une personne consent habituellement à pratiquer des rapports sexuels avec un 
nombre indéterminé d'autres personnes moyennant rémuneration” (“The act whereby a person 
consents as a matter of  habit to the practice of  having sexual relations with an 
undetermined number of  other persons in exchange for remuneration”). The 
definition employed in Article 231 is thus broader than the French definition: it 
explicitly includes ‘occasional prostitution’ (sudfa in Arabic) as opposed to the habit 
and the undetermined number of  persons mentioned in the French dictionary. As a 
result, judges may qualify ‘one-night stands’ as prostitution. This may even be true 
if  there is no remuneration, since the element of  the counterpart is absent in Article 
231.     
29 The amount, which is low in comparison to the prison sentence, has never been adapted since the 
reintroduction of the article in 1964. 
30 Note that the first two interdictions apply to women only (male prostitution is not foreseen by the 
law), while the latter applies to both sexes. In light of the generalisation of male prostitution and 
same sex sex tourism in the Maghreb in general and in Tunisia in particular (see for instance Beau-
mont 2010), and of Bourguiba’s legislative efforts in the field of gender equality, it is surprising that 
the article only applies to female prostitutes. 
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The use of  the term khina’ instead of  bagha’ combined with the fact that 
Article 231 includes occasional prostitution raises the question as to what Article 
231 intends to forbid: does khina’ denote prostitution, i.e. sex for remuneration, or 
does it include all extra-marital sex? The positioning of  the article gives an answer 
here. The article forms part of  Title II of  the 1913 Criminal Code, titled ‘Attacks 
against persons’, and falls under section III, ‘Fornication’ (i‘tida‘ b-al-fawahish). 
Section III starts with a sub-section on the violation of  morality (ikhlaq), containing 
articles on public violation of  good morals and sexual harassment. Sub-section II 
concerns ‘impudence’ (haya’), punishing rape, sexual relations with a minor, and 
homosexuality. Article 231 is the first provision of  sub-section III, titled ‘Incitement 
to unlawful fornication’ (tahrid ‘ala fi‘li al-khina’). Article 231 forbids khina’ and 
cooperation (musharaka), and the following article forbids pimping (being a middle 
man, wasit in Arabic). If  the provision concerned all unlawful fornication, it would 
rather be situated in the first sub-section of  the section on fornication than in a 
sub-section titled ‘Incitement to unlawful fornication’. Also, if  Article 231 
concerned all extra-marital relations, it would not be conceivable to punish the 
woman as the ‘unlawful fornicator’, and the man as her ‘accomplice’, nor would the 
provisions on middlemen be logically placed here. Besides, the article’s reference to 
the 1942 decree on legal prostitution suggests that the article concerns prostitution, 
that is: sex in exchange for remuneration, only. 
3. Formal versus informal 
When looking at court practice in the field of  sexuality, it appears that 
judges punish all extra-marital sex via the prostitution article. A case from 1977 can 
serve as an example here.31 According to the facts as they are described in the 
ruling, a woman named Monjia went to a local court on 23 February 1977, for some 
personal paperwork. Possibly intimidated by the bureaucratic requirements, she 
asked a man who was responsible for the maintenance of  the heating devices in the 
31 Court of Cassation 1 December 1977, 1975. 
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building for his help. After the man had helped her out, he asked her if, given “the 
risk he had taken by helping her”, she was willing to sleep with him in return. 
According to the ruling she consented, and they went together down to the boiler 
room, “of  which he had the key, given that he was the manager of  the heating 
device in this building”, as the ruling specifies. According to the court, they had 
sexual intercourse there, “with penetration” (note that Article 231 does not require 
penetration). In the meantime, one of  the guards became suspicious and notified 
the head of  the clerk’s office. They went to the chamber and knocked on the door, 
but the suspects remained silent. They went back up to get a key and when they 
entered the room, they found the suspects “in a suspicious pose”. The officers 
brought the police in, and Monjia and her accomplice were arrested. The police 
prosecuted her on suspicion of  prostitution and him for sleeping with a prostitute. 
The Court of  First Instance sentenced both to one year in prison, which the Court 
of  Appeal in Tunis confirmed.32 The man’s lawyer brought the case before the 
highest court (the Court of  Cassation), arguing that it was physically impossible that 
they had sexual intercourse, because the room was too small and because 
insufficient time had passed before the court officers had entered the room. 
However, the legal defense is of  particular relevance for the study: the lawyer 
pointed at the issue of  remuneration, stating that since Monjia had not received any 
money nor gifts, her deed could not be qualified as prostitution, adding that the 
man’s favour was too negligible to be qualified as remuneration. Nevertheless, the 
Court of  Cassation ruled in favour of  the prosecution. The court argued that the 
act can be qualified as prostitution, because Article 231 does not require repetition 
nor remuneration. As a result, a one-time stand was punished with the use of  the 
prostitution article. And the case of  Monjia does not stand alone. For instance, in 
the most recent case in our collection, a decision from 2006, the court sentenced a 
couple to prison after they had been found together in a “suspicious pose”. Here, 
32 Court of Appeal Tunis, 22 March 1977, 86970. 
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too, the court argued that remuneration is not required for an act to be qualified as 
prostitution.33 
In other rulings, the court does require remuneration, but this does not 
influence its practice: insignificant amounts of  money suffice. In a case from 1991, 
a woman had a one-night stand with the husband of  her sister in the marital home. 
After the act she had presumably told the man that he now owed her 5 Tunisian 
Dinars (2 euros 50). As the court considered it proven that she had made this 
remark, the sexual act was considered prostitution, because the court qualified the 
debt as remuneration.34 In a case from 1994, the police arrested two men and two 
women in Tajerouine, a small town near the Algerian border. One of  the men 
declared to the police that he had invited the women to the house of  his friend to 
have sexual intercourse. After the Court of  First Instance had sentenced the women 
to four months in prison, the Court of  Appeal in Le Kef  released them for lack of  
evidence of  remuneration.35 When the Public Prosecution brought the case before 
the highest court, the latter convicted them, stating that, since the men had taken 
the women out for dinner, where they had eaten together and drank alcohol at the 
expense of  the men, there was remuneration.36 
The wide interpretation of  the article on prostitution is not limited to cases 
of  one-night stands. A few rulings show that courts qualified sexual relations 
between people who were in a relationship or engaged to be married, as 
‘prostitution’. For instance, in a case from 1985, a certain Bya had ‘submitted’ 
herself  (sexually) to her boyfriend Naji, who had asked her to marry him and who 
had given her money and pieces of  furniture.37 The highest court qualified the 
relationship as prostitution, arguing that the law does not require repetition (in the 
sense of  different clients) and that she had received remuneration in the form of  
33 Court of Cassation 1 March 2006, 12526. 
34 Court of Cassation 27 March 1991, 30735. 
35 Court of Appeal of Le Kef, 3 March 1992, 28790. 
36 Court of Cassation 19 September 1994, 43753. 
37 Court of Cassation 12 June 1985, 8946. 
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money and furniture. It should be noted that it is custom in Tunisia to offer one’s 
fiancée money and furniture (adbash) to furnish the future marital home.38 
 
3.1 Lower courts and police 
Having focused on the rulings from the highest court, it is now important to 
delve into how the decisions from the highest court reflect the practices of  lower 
courts and other State officials, particularly the Public Prosecution and the police. 
These lower State institutions had an even more elaborate practice of  prosecuting 
and sanctioning people for prostitution than the highest court. For instance, in a 
case from 1970, the police arrested a woman and her partner for prostitution and 
sleeping with a prostitute because she had been observed at the man’s place 
“without a reason”, and the Court of  First Instance and the Court of  Appeal ruled 
in favour of  the prosecution. It was only when the case came before the highest 
court that the couple were released.39 Another example concerns a case from 1995 
where six young Tunisian men and women, who were on holidays on the island of  
Jerba, were arrested after a man had called the police for he heard “screaming and 
blasphemy” in the neighbouring apartment. According to the ruling, two of  the 
couples were in a relationship, while the third woman and the third man first met on 
the island. The Public Prosecution decided to bring the case against all six of  them 
before the court, but the courts acquitted them.40 
Another case from 1975 pertains to a couple that was engaged to be 
married. Roqayya, who was engaged to an air force officer, was pregnant with his 
child when he broke off  the engagement accusing her of  having another bed 
partner. Roqayya then went to the police, possibly because she felt that there must 
be a legal remedy to this unjust behaviour or because she hoped that, by filing a 
complaint and stating officially before the police who was the father of  her child, 
38 One could contend that marriage gifts are in fact nothing else than an exchange for the woman’s 
sexual services, as Kecia Ali argues (Ali 2010). However, the discussion on the similarities between 
prostitution and marriage in early Islam falls out of the scope of this paper. 
39 Court of First Instance Kairouan (n.d.), Court of Appeal Sousse, 30 March 1970, 13498. 
40 Court of First Instance Mednin, 30 September 1992, 57092 and Court of Appeal Mednin, 4 No-
vember 1992, 7684. Court of Cassation 17 January 1995, 48419. They did get sentenced for blas-
phemy. 
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she could forebear giving birth to a bastard. However, the police immediately 
arrested Roqayya (and later also her ex-fiancé) for prostitution. When the case was 
brought before the highest court, the latter stated there was no prostitution since 
their intention had been to get married.41 
These cases confirm that the police had a wider practice of  
instrumentalising the prostitution article than courts did. It should be pointed out 
here that the police’s practice is even wider than what is reflected in court rulings: I 
have shown elsewhere that the majority of  cases that the police treats as 
prostitution do not even come before the court, since such cases are often handled 
informally in the form of  bribes (Voorhoeve 2014). 
 
3.2 Blurring the distinction between formal and informal norms 
The practices analysed in this section demonstrate that the distinction be-
tween formal and informal has little bearing in the Tunisian authoritarian context, as 
judges (and other authorities) applied an informal norm, which they justified 
through the invocation of Article 231. The norm prohibiting pre-marital and extra-
marital sex is therefore no longer outright informal, in the sense of not regulated by 
the State (as in Routh’s definition), since it is reproduced by State officials.  
It is important to point out here that this formalisation occurs in all time pe-
riods studied: the rulings cited date from 1970, 1975, 1977, 1985, 1991, 1994, 1995, 
and 2006. This shows that judicial practice was not more liberal or more illiberal 
during Bourguiba’s or Ben Ali’s rule. Where both rulers issued laws pertaining to 
the ‘modernisation’ of the field of gender and sexuality, the judges adjudicating the 
cases discussed here, did not follow suit. The question arises as to why the Tunisian 
authoritarian State, who is the producer of formal norms, would approve of judicial 
practice that deviates not only from Tunisian legislation, but also from the modern-
ist and secularist State discourse. This question is the object of the final part of this 
article. 
 
41 Court of Cassation 16 April 1975, 11280. 
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4. Legislation, informal norms, and window dressing 
 
Through the instrumentalisation of  Article 231 to punish extra-marital 
sexual relations ranging from one-night stands to pre-marital relationships, the 
Court brings formal law closer to lived law. However, in a civil law country as 
Tunisia, it is the legislator, not the judge, who makes the law. By applying a broad 
interpretation of  Article 231, the court takes upon itself  the role of  the legislator. 
In a country with such a strong French legal tradition, this self-attribution of  
legislative powers by courts is certainly surprising, as traditionally in French law, 
judges are the mere bouches de la loi (mouthpieces of  the law) (Charfi 1997). But the 
authoritarian character of  the regime makes it even more surprising since, especially 
in Tunisia, the power was centered in the government or even in the person of  the 
ruler.42 Indeed, when judges deviate from the ruler’s will as expressed in legislation, 
this is certainly a violation of  the power structure. This violation is all the more 
important since the practices described above contradict the modernist and 
secularist State discourse. I argue that the reason why the formalisation of  the 
illiberal informal norm was nevertheless possible, lies in the fact that the State was 
merely concerned with what is generally called ‘window dressing’. This term refers 
to situations where rulers are merely concerned with formal law as a means to 
convey a modernist image, while at the same time remaining indifferent to its actual 
implementation. 
 
4.1 Window dressing as part of  authoritarian State feminism 
In the field of  gender and sexuality, the formal laws and policies under 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali were the product of  what I call ‘authoritarian State 
feminism’. In Middle Eastern Women’s Studies the term ‘State feminism’ 
systematically refers to state policy with negative connotations associated with 
authoritarianism.43 However, such authoritarian connotation is not a given in other 
42 As is argued by Camau and others, supra.  
43 See for instance White 2003.  For the Tunisian case, see Sana Ben Achour 2001. 
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geographical areas. Mervat Hatem states that the term was coined in studies of  
Scandinavian societies, referring to “government efforts to remove the structural 
basis of  gender inequality” (Hatem 1992, p. 231). In their chapter on comparative 
State feminism, Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy G. Mazur define State feminism 
as the whole of  the ‘State’s women’s policy machinery’ (McBride Stetson and Mazur 
2010, p. 319). Since the Tunisian women’s policy machinery did not merely consist 
of  government efforts to remove structural inequalities because of  its authoritarian 
characteristics, I prefer to distinguish authoritarian State feminism from other forms 
of  State feminism.  
The term ‘authoritarian State feminism’ suggests three things. The first 
characteristic is connected to the decision-making process, in the sense that the 
policies are implemented by an authoritarian regime instead of  originating in a 
democratic institution.44 The second and third factor are inspired on Mazur and 
McBride Stetson’s parameters in evaluating the State’s policy machinery (McBride 
Stetson and Mazur 2010). The second characteristic then is that the policy does not 
so much aim at improving the situation of  women as it does window dressing, 
particularly in the face of  civil and political rights violations. The third characteristic 
is that there are few opportunities for civil society to engage in discussions on law 
reform. Besides, it is important to point out here that since it concerns a post-
colonial context, discourses of  modernisation and of  women’s liberation are typical 
for authoritarian State feminism in post-colonial States engaged in nation building 
upon independence.45  
In Tunisia, laws pertaining to gender and sexuality are the product of  
authoritarian State feminism: first of  all, the Criminal Code was the product of  
44 This factor should not be taken too literally. Indeed, studies in Comparative Politics have shown 
the various faces of authoritarianism. Although present-day Tunisia has a democratic government, its 
women’s policy machinery still has authoritarian characteristics. See Ben Said 2017.   
45 Laura Bier argues for Nasserist State feminism that it is not just a series of policies, but “a constel-
lation of normalising discourses, practices, legal measures, and state-building programs aimed at 
making women into modern political subjects”. She continues to state that what these policies have in 
common is “a normative vision of female ‘liberation’ as necessary to the task of building a modern, 
independent nation capable of overcoming the debilitating legacies of colonial […] rule” (Bier 2011, 
p. 7). 
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colonial rule, with no democratic background whatsoever. The PSC, composed by a 
three-headed committee appointed by Bourguiba, was promulgated without passing  
Parliament, and the reforms of  both laws passed a Parliament that consisted of  the 
ruling party (Tunisia had a de facto single party system). Second, there was little to 
no room for civil society in the discussion of  laws and policies: the repression of  
actors discussing women’s rights under Bourguiba and Ben Ali can hardly be 
exaggerated. In the 1970s and 80s, civil society increasingly formulated critique on 
the women’s policy machinery in general and the PSC in particular. The Mouvement 
de Tendance Islamique (MTI), a religious movement established in the 70s, criticised 
the PSC, drawing attention to the high divorce rates among other things (Daoud 
1993, p. 93). Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the regime put a ban on the 
MTI, arresting its members, and anyone uttering similar critique on the State’s 
women’s policy machinery was silenced. Indeed, like in Egypt, Tunisian State 
feminism “not only entailed authoritarian political repression but also demanded the 
refashioning of  the sensibilities, commitments, and social worlds of  women (and 
men) whose lives contrasted with its emancipatory vision” (Bier 2011, p. 181). The 
same was true for those for whom the ‘modernisation’ and ‘emancipation’ did not 
go fast enough. The Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD), a 
movement of  liberal feminists (on this term, see Al-Ali 2003), expressed critique on 
the PSC and other laws and policies, such as the legal problems connected to 
children born out of  wedlock, who did not have a family name and subsequently an 
ID card. Ben Ali legalised the ATFD in 1989, but its members were under 
continuous surveillance, its funding was often blocked and its activities frustrated. 
For instance, when a group of  feminist activists started to publish a journal (An-
Nissa’) as a platform to address issues related to gender discrimination and related 
issues, the magazine was soon taken off  the market (Marzouki 1993, p. 258). 
Indeed, against the background of  the repression of  women’s rights organisations, 
it is ironic to call Tunisian policies ‘feminist’:46 the idea of  women’s emancipation 
46 See Bier with a similar argument on Nasser (Bier 2011, p. 7). 
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formed part of  nation building, but it did not mean that women could actually 
participate in a debate that concerned them.47  
Where the repression of  civil society was a generalised phenomenon, the 
question of  the ‘true’ intention to improve the situation of  women as opposed to 
mere window dressing is more complex. As for family law, much can be said about 
the persistence of  patriarchal norms throughout the PSC: it stated that the wife 
should obey her husband, and until today, it states that the wife is financially 
dependent on her spouse. Nevertheless, for those reforms that took place in the 
name of  women’s emancipation (no matter how they are evaluated from a feminist 
standpoint today), State propaganda justifying the reforms and condemning 
‘backward practices’ suggests that there was a true intention to change things (Yadh 
Ben Achour 1987, Tobich 2008). For instance, in the first decade after 
independence, the government was involved in a ‘media rally’ against polygamy, 
trying to convince the people that this practice should end. The same was true for 
the legalisation of  abortion, in particular when the law was modified in 1965 and 
1973 allowing abortion up to three months into pregnancy. This was accompanied 
by an effective policy, installing centres where such abortions could be carried out 
anonymously.  
Regardless of  these ‘true intentions’ of  ‘modernisation’ and ‘liberalisation’, 
the crucial role of  Tunisia’s image as a ‘modern’ state cannot be denied.48  In Tunisia, 
feminist policy formed an intrinsic part of  the identity that the State constructed 
domestically as well as abroad, especially in the West. Tunisian historian Sophie 
Bessis aptly describes this when she writes “The Tunisian regime has become a 
master in the art of  brochures. No visitor to the country, no-one invited to the 
embassy, no participant in a meeting with Tunisia as its theatre or object escapes the 
dissemination of  an abundant documentation boasting Tunisia’s merits and 
47 Except the appointed members of the national women's rights organisation, the Union Nationale des 
Femmes Tunisiennes, established in the 1950s. 
48 Also, with the years, co-opting women’s rights activists, who formed part of a cultural and eco-
nomic elite, that was often secularised and westernised, was an important impetus. 
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progress. Women and their condition play a prominent role in this domain” (Bessis 
1999, p. 1).  
In the field of  sex laws, the intention to change practice, however, appears 
entirely absent: changing sexual mores does not appear to have formed part of  
Bourguiba’s or Ben Ali’s modernisation projects. There was no State discourse 
surrounding the liberalisation of  sexual mores, neither in the media nor through 
other channels (e.g. in school education). On the contrary, I observed in the years 
2000 that even family judges (who are competent in cases of  marriage and divorce) 
informed couples that having sexual relations before the marriage festivities was 
forbidden (Voorhoeve 2018). The unique reason why Bourguiba did not introduce 
an article punishing extra-marital sex to adapt the formal norms to the informal 
ones (as did the Moroccan King in the 1960s) thus appears to be again a matter of  
window dressing: such reform would conflict with the modernist and secularist 
image that he was trying to build. The aspect of  window dressing (building Tunisia’s 
modernist image) explains why today for 90 % of  Tunisians, extra-marital sex is 
unacceptable. It also explains why judges can use the provision on prostitution to 
punish extra-marital sex. With respect to its sex laws, the State is merely concerned 
with the formal law and has no interest in its actual implementation. 
 
4.2 Ambivalence 
At this point, it is useful to return to the wording of  Article 231: the law 
appears to fit in the modernisation project, but judges are left with wide 
discretionary powers, because the law does not define khina’ and the article includes 
occasional prostitution. This vagueness is a recurrent feature in Tunisian legislation 
related to gender. For Tunisian legal scholar and activist Sana Ben Achour, this 
vagueness originates in an ambiguity in the regime’s intentions to ‘modernise’ and 
‘secularise’. Despite a general modernist State discourse, the regime often failed to 
go all the way (Sana Ben Achour 2005-2006). For instance, in the PSC, allowing 
divorce for harm without specifying what harm is, opened the way for judges to 
apply Islamic precepts connected to the wife’s duty to obey her husband 
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(Voorhoeve 2014). Tunisian political scientist Larbi Chouikha explains this 
ambiguity as fitting the regime’s continuous struggle for legitimacy in an 
ideologically divided society. Since the regime had not obtained its legitimacy 
through the ballot box and needed a minimum of  support, it chose against siding 
entirely with one of  the two dominant ideological forces (leftists, liberals and 
secularists on the one hand, and conservatives and Islamists on the other). 
Especially in periods where Bourguiba and later Ben Ali were facing an uproar of  
either secularist/communist or Islamist/conservative forces, they reshaped their 
official discourse. The regime often chose to take no clear stance on issues on the 
intersection between law and morality, for instance through clear legislation, and the 
judiciary had relative freedom to move between the two forces in society (Chouikha 
2005). As a result, there were liberal judicial practices as well, where courts adopted 
a legalistic approach to extra-marital sex, restricting the reach of  Article 231.  
Part of  the rulings from the Court of  Cassation go against the tendency to 
punish extra-marital sex through the prostitution article. In these rulings, judges do 
curtail the scope of  Article 231, stating that there are two constituent elements for 
the crime of  prostitution: remuneration (muqabil) and repetition (ta‘awwud).49 A 
ruling from 1998 can serve as an example of  this practice. In this case, a mother 
had called the police when her daughter was out with a friend and had not come 
home to their house in Tunis. The police found the young women in Beja, a town 
100 km away from the capital. When they declared that they had been with a certain 
Radouane, the police arrested them together with three young men. The Court of  
First Instance in Tunis, the capital, sentenced all five of  them: the daughter for 
prostitution (six months), her friend for mediating this (pimping, four months), the 
men for sleeping with a prostitute (two months) and one of  them for making his 
apartment available (qualified as pimping, one month). The Court of  Appeal in 
49 Court of Cassation, 21 December 1970, 7509; 16 April 1975, 11280; 29 November 1978, 2475; 21 
July 1979, 3634; 28 December 1983, 8912; 17 January 1995, 48419.  
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Tunis, however, released the suspects for lack of  remuneration, and the Court of  
Cassation confirmed this.50   
In other cases, the court gives an even narrower definition of  prostitution, 
requiring the presence of  additional elements, such as the intention (niyya) of  
prostitution,51 the intention of  trade,52 or the element of  occupation (prostitution as 
a job).53 A ruling that uses a specifically narrow interpretation of  Article 231 
concerns a case from 1988 on the 17-year-old Fathiyya.54 According to the court, 
the facts had been established as follows. On a night in 1984, Fathiyya left her 
father’s house at one in the afternoon to go to her employer’s house and get her 
overdue payments. The employer, who, according to the court, was known for her 
‘bad morals’, refused, but apparently made some remarks about Fathiyya’s looks. 
She then asked Fathiyya to accompany her to a friend’s house. Fathiyya agreed, and 
at this friend’s house, the women met a certain Boulbaba, the friend’s husband, who 
proposed they go to the land of  a certain Kamel. They brought some wine for the 
occasion and the four of  them headed to Kamel’s place. According to the ruling, 
Kamel made out with Fathiyya, after which she had intercourse with Boulbaba, 
‘with her consent’, as the court points out,55 and then with a third man. When her 
father was made aware of  this, he notified the police. The court in Gabes sentenced 
Fathiyya to time in an educational center in La Manouba. The Court of  Appeal 
nullified the ruling and Fathiyya was acquitted. The Public Prosecutor brought the 
case before the Court of  Cassation, arguing that Fathiyya had confessed to the 
sexual relations, after which she had had food and wine with the men, which should 
be qualified as a remuneration. The highest court rejected the appeal, stating that 
the remuneration should be in the form of  money (nuqud) and should be a certain 
amount that is agreed upon in advance, and that there should be an intention of  
trade, since “the aim of  prostitutes is money and trade,” as the court points out. 
50 Court of Cassation, 22 January 1998, 76182. 
51 Court of Cassation 16 April 1975, 11280. 
52 Court of Cassation 5 January 1988, 15255. 
53 Court of Cassation 22 January 1998, 76182. 
54 Court of Cassation 5 January 1988, 15255. 
55 Probably in order to point out that the act cannot be qualified as rape, which is punished by Arti-
cle 227 of the Tunisian Penal Code. 
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These rulings, dating from 1975, 1988, and 1998, show that both 
interpretations existed under the authoritarian regimes of  Bourguiba and Ben Ali. 
They prove that the government was not trying to encourage judges to interpret 
Article 231 in an illiberal way; it was simply not interested in how the law was 
implemented, as long as the formal norm did not contradict the modernist 
discourse. The consequence of  using a vague crime description was a casuistic and 
unpredictable legal practice, where Article 231 hangs as a sword of  Damocles above 
the heads of  people engaging in extra-marital sex. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Where non-positivist legal studies take a dualistic approach to law, the dis-
tinction between the formal and the informal does not take the practices in authori-
tarian contexts into account where formal and informal norms do not coincide, and 
judges can take the liberty to interpret vague laws in order to formalise the informal 
norm. In such cases, the societal norm is no longer outright informal in the sense of 
not regulated by the State, because it has been institutionalised by State officials. 
This phenomenon is particularly facilitated in situations where the formal norm is 
the result of authoritarian State feminism, where repression allows that laws and 
policies in the field of gender and sexuality conflict with the norms living in society, 
and where such laws serve as mere window dressing, granting judges wide discre-
tionary powers. This is even more true when the State is ambivalent on its aim to 
modernise, resulting in vague legislative prescriptions. The issuing of discretionary 
powers allows judges and other legal institutions to practice all sorts of interpreta-
tions, fitting the modernisation discourse or the norms living in society.  
At the end of  this article on authoritarian judicial practice in Tunisia, the 
question arises as to the influence of  the 2011 ‘revolution’ on these practices. 
Although I was unable to retrieve any post 2011 rulings, there are several reasons to 
believe that these practices did not alter upon regime change. First, the regime 
change did not provoke a replacement of  criminal judges, police officers or public 
prosecutors. Since the same persons apply Article 231, a change of  practice is 
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unlikely except in case of  law reform or official instructions. So far, Article 231 was 
not modified, and it is unlikely that the State issued instructions on the application 
of  Article 231 since the regime has, up to now, not taken a stance on the issue of  
instrumentalising legislation to punish acts that are strictly speaking not forbidden. 
In fact, since the liberalisation of  the media in 2011, journalists have related a series 
of  incidents concerning police officers abusing their power by arresting people for 
‘morality crimes’ that are not explicitly punishable by law, such as drinking alcohol.56 
Moreover, the current government, consisting of  the conservative movement 
Ennahda and the party Nida’ Tounes that is close to the previous regime, has a 
tendency to remain ambivalent on issues pertaining to religion and morality. This is 
true despite the series of  law reforms that were carried out since 2014, including the 
law on violence against women: as I argue elsewhere, the regime decided to leave 
certain legal maxims untouched, including the PSC which contains provisions such 
as Article 12, legitimising rape within marriage.57  And finally, a famous case of  2012 
shows that upon regime change, police and public prosecutors persisted their 
practice of  punishing people for extra-marital sex; in this case, on the grounds of  
the public violation of  morality.58  
Even if  judicial practice has not changed, the opening up of  the public 
sphere following the downfall of  the authoritarian regime in 2011 has enabled civil 
society actors to voice demands for legal reform. In June 2018, the working group 
Colibe (Coalition des libertés individuelles et de l'égalité) issued a report calling for further 
reform, including Article 231 in its proposals. The coalition proposes to replace the 
term sudfa (occasionally) with ‘ala wajh al-i‘tiyad, ‘habitually’.59 It states that the term 
sudfa accounts for wide discretionary powers, leading to arbitrary court practices, 
condemning women who did not practice prostitution.60 To my knowledge, this is 
the first time that the court practice discussed in this article is brought to the 
56 See for instance Boukhayatia 2016a and 2016b. This new media coverage does not suggest that 
such practices increased, but that the media can talk about it openly. 
57 Maaike Voorhoeve, ‘Justice transitionnelle et confrontation avec l’héritage juridique: la réforme des 
lois tunisiennes relatives aux questions de genre’ (under review). 
58 The case of Meriem Ben Mohamed (pseudonym). 
59 Report Colibe, 1 June 2018, p. 94. 
60 Report Colibe, 1 June 2018, p. 42. 
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attention of  the Tunisian public. Whether or not the government will act upon this 
advice remains to be seen: vague crime descriptions allowing for arbitrary court 
practices certainly serve authoritarian regimes, and for the time being, the current 
government has not proven to have distanced itself  entirely from pre-existing 
authoritarian practices. 
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